

### Many thanks to our sponsors and partners!





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4/29/24 | Rico Komenda





### Rico Komenda

#### Who?

- Husband and father
- Senior Security Consultant @ adesso SE
- International trainer and speaker
- Consulting
  - AppSec, CloudSec, OffSec, AlSec

### Mission statement: Securing the digital world, one byte at a time

### **EFFECTS OF CYBER ATTACKS**




**2022: around 136,000 registered cybercrime offences in DE** Increase of +3% compared to the previous year

**CYBERCRIME** 

How does it happen?


- > Strongly advancing digitalization
- Increasing professionalization of perpetrators
- > Low barriers to entry through CaaS (Cybercrime-as-a-Service)

Cybercrime: professional business




### **SECURITY IS A PROCESS**





### **SOFTWARE DEVELOPMENT LIFECYCLE**





### **DEVOPS CYCLE**










Dev

Ops

Sec


**DEVSECOPS** 





### **SECDEVOPS & SHIFT-LEFT**






### **SECURITY CONCEPTS**

 $\mathsf{a} \mathsf{j}$ 

- 1 Assume Breach & Zero Trust
- 2 Defense in Depth
- 3 Principle of least privilege
- 4 Principle of failing securely
- 5 Supply Chain Security
- 6 Security by Obscurity
- 7 Attack Surface Reduction
- 8 Useable Security



# ASSUME BREACH & & ZERO TRUST




# DEFENSE IN DEPTH

### LAYERED DEFENSE IN DEPTH




- Layers of security, instead of only one defense, use several
- In case on layer fails, another will protect your system



### **DEFENSE IN DEPTH IN THE SOFTWARE LAYER**





# PRINCIPLE OF LEAST PRIVILEGE


### PRINCIPLE OF LEAST PRIVILEGE



 Providing only the amount of access and permission required to perform a specific function and nothing more

### **EXAMPLE: AWS DYNAMODB**





# PRINCIPLE OF FAILING SECURELY



REAL-LIFE EXAMPLE:
DOOR-LOCK
FAILING OPEN VS. SECURELY

### PRINCIPLE OF FAILING SECURELY

a

Confidentiality

Integrity

Availibility

Security

Dependability

Safety

Reliability

Maintainability

### **SECURITY CHAOS ENGINEERING @ CLOUD**



ID	Cloud Resource	Chaos Action	Description
AP1	User	create	create random user
AP2	User	delete	delete existing user
AP3	User	modify	change user configuration e.g. privileges, role or group
AP4	Policy	create	create new policies with random ACLs and attach to cloud resource(s)
AP4	Policy	modify	modify existing policy e.g. change ACL to deny original owner access to the resource
AP6	Policy	delete	detach policy from a resource, delete the policy
AP7	Role	create	create a new role
AP8	Bucket	make public	alter private configuration to public
AP9	Bucket	disable logging	stop logging API calls against bucket
AP10	Bucket	make unavailable	simulate bucket unavailability e.g. by changing bucket ACL from ALLOW to DENY

### **SECURITY ENGINEERING TOOLS**










ChaosToolkit




- All of the components, libraries, frameworks and any other code you did not write, that you put in your app make up your supply chain
- Each dependency needs to be secure





### SolarWinds - Attack through a trusted system with privileged access





Supply chain risk management

Customers

Indirect provider:

Third-party risk management

Open source dependencies


Free SaaS tools

Vendor risk management

Paid SaaS tools

Paid on-premise tools





### SECURITY BY OBSCURITY




### **SECURITY BY OBSCURITY**



### The Kerchoff Principle

A cryptographic system should be secure even if everything about the system, except the key, is public knowledge





REAL-LIFE EXAMPLE:
PASSWORD ON PAPER
UNDER THE KEYBOARD

### **SECURITY BY OBSCURITY**




**PROS** 

CONS

### **SECURITY BY OBSCURITY**





# ATTACK SURFACE REDUCTION





## REMOVE ANY UNUSED PARTS OF YOUR CODE





# EVERY PART OF YOUR APPS AND SYSTEM IS PART OF YOUR ATTACK SURFACE




THE LESS YOU HAVE, THE LESS THERE IS TO ATTACK


## **USEABLE SECURITY**

#### **USEABLE SECURITY**
















IF SECURITY FEATURES
CAUSE USER PROBLEMS,
THEY'LL FIND WAYS
AROUND THEM



COMPROMISES AND CREATIVE SOLUTIONS CAN LEAD TO CUSTOMER DELIGHT AND BETTER COMPLIANCE

#### **DESIGN PRINICPLES, KAI- PING YEE**





## SOME TYPICAL APPSEC STUFF

#### **OPEN SECURITY ARCHITECTURE**



#### **Architectural principles**

Simplicity over flexibility

Usability over restriction

Defence in depth

#### Implementation principles

Open design

Secure coding practices Black box and white box testing

#### **Operation and Configuration principles**


Complete mediation

Least privilege

Audit trails

#### **APPLICATION SECURITY TESTING**





#### **THREAT MODELLING**



**SPOOFING TAMPERING REPUDIATION STRIDE METHODOLOGY INFORMATION** DISCLOSURE DENIAL OF SERVICE (DOS) **PRIVILEGE** 

Set objectives Visualize Identify threats Mitigate Validate




#### OWASP Application Security Verification Standard 4.0.2



The OWASP Application Security Verification Standard (ASVS) Project provides a basis for testing web application technical security controls and also provides developers with a list of requirements for secure development.





#### **OUR RESULT AT THE END**



### **QUESTIONS?**

#### **THANK YOU!**





#### **Rico Komenda**

